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LAW AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF AMERICAN 
CAPITALISM 
William J. Novak∗ 
To hold the balance true between the material and the human values 
of life is the oldest and the newest economic problem. 
—Walton Hale Hamilton1 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay is part of a larger, ongoing investigation of the role of law in the 
creation of a modern American state from 1877 to 1932.  That project charts 
the decline of an early nineteenth-century world of local, common law self-
government (what I called in a previous work a “well-regulated society”2) and 
the rise of a distinctly modern administrative regulatory state in the United 
States.  This new legal-political regime was rooted in three interlinked 
developments: the centralization of public power; the individualization of 
private right; and the constitutionalization of the rule of law.3  Beginning soon 
after the Civil War, nineteenth-century common law understandings of the 
public obligations of associative communities in a confederated republic were 
increasingly replaced by a new emphasis on the constitutional rights of 
individual citizens in a nation-state—a nation-state insistently expanding its 
general police and regulatory authority.4 
 
 ∗ Professor at University of Michigan Law School.  I wish to thank helpful and critical colleagues and 
audiences at the Emory Law Journal’s Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, the University of Michigan Law 
School Fawley Workshop, the National Bureau of Economic Research Economic History Group, and the 
Business History Seminar at Harvard Business School. 
  1 CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS: A SERIES OF READINGS IN THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT, at ix (Walton Hale Hamilton ed., rev. ed. 1919). 
 2 WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 1 (1996) (“At the heart of the well-regulated society was a plethora of bylaws, ordinances, statutes, 
and common law restrictions” that “dominated United States social and economic policymaking from 1787 to 
1877.”). 
 3 The early nineteenth-century governmental regime is the subject of my first book.  See id.  Two other 
articles highlighting different aspects of the creation of the liberal state are William J. Novak, The Legal 
Origins of the Modern American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 249 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 
2002), and William J. Novak, The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century America, in THE 
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY 85 (Meg Jacobs et al. eds., 
2003). 
 4 NOVAK, supra note 2, at 235–48. 
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The project has three overarching interpretive objectives.  First, it 
emphasizes the distinctive power and reach (as opposed to the exceptional 
weakness and limits) of the twentieth-century American state created in this 
period.  In line with a recent wave of revisionist scholarship on American 
governance, it holds that the American state is and has been consistently 
stronger, larger, more durable, more interventionist, and more redistributive 
than accounted for in any earlier U.S. historiography.5  Consequently, it 
attempts to come to grips with one of the fundamental yet underexplained facts 
of modern American history—the emergence of a global geopolitical and 
legal-economic leviathan.  Second, the project asserts that law played a 
fundamentally positive and creative (as opposed to negative and restrictive) 
role in the development of that modern American state.  In contrast to an 
extensive legal-political literature emphasizing the role of law as primarily a 
constitutional limitation on, or hindrance or obstruction to, the growth of the 
American state, this project highlights law as a formative and forceful 
“technology of public action”6—a distinctive source of expansive 
governmental authority in a critical period of United States political and 
economic development.  Third, and very much related to the special role of law 
in American state-building, the project investigates the close interdependence 
of expanding central powers and new constitutional liberties.  Though 
frequently presented as opposed developments, this study argues that the 
essence of the governmental regime established in turn-of-the-century America 
was the simultaneous centralization of new state powers and the 
constitutionalization of new individual rights.  The new American state created 
in this period was both a jural and a regulatory state—a product of the rule of 
law as well as modern political administration. 
 
 5 See William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752, 752 (2008) 
(“[While t]he American present witnesses the steady aggrandizement of executive, administrative, emergency, 
penal, military, and war powers . . . . the history that America most frequently tells itself highlights a story of 
relative powerlessness . . . .”).  Some important recent entries in this revisionist project include DANIEL P. 
CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY 
INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928 (2001); CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE 
STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1997); DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL 
ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (2002); Michele Landis Dauber, The 
Sympathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 387 (2005); Richard R. John, Governmental Institutions as Agents of 
Change: Rethinking American Political Development in the Early Republic, 1787–1835, 11 STUD. AM. POL. 
DEV. 347 (1997). 
 6 I owe the phrase “technology of public action” to Hendrik Hartog, whose work on property law as a 
tool of early New York City governance is a classic example of this approach to law.  HENDRIK HARTOG, 
PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 
1730–1870, at 66 (1983). 
NOVAK GALLEYSFINAL 2/24/2011  9:30 AM 
2010] LAW & THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 379 
In the context of this larger story of legal and governmental transformation, 
the subject of this particular Essay is economic policy—the origins of modern 
American economic regulation.  The period from 1877 to 1932 basically marks 
the development of modern capitalism in the United States—a realignment of 
economic actors and institutions in a market system more industrial, more 
organized, and more corporate.  Perhaps most importantly, this modern 
capitalism was also decidedly more state and policy centered, shaped and 
directed by a new legal and political regime of economic rules and regulations 
that define this period of American history.  Part II of this Essay attempts to 
present a new interpretation highlighting this interrelationship of legal 
statecraft and modern American capitalism.  Subsequent Parts try to bolster 
that interpretation with evidence drawn from intellectual history, particularly a 
new legal-economic discourse concerning “the social control of business” in 
Part III, as well as a case study of the emerging legal concept of public utility 
in Part IV.  But, of course, the general topic of law and economic regulation in 
the Gilded Age and Progressive Era is not exactly terra verde.  
Historiographically, it resembles something more akin to a burnt-over district.  
So it is perhaps useful at the outset, in Part I, to stake quickly a few interpretive 
boundaries so as to make room for new claims. 
I. INTERPRETATIONS OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND REGULATION 
There are basically four different, dominant interpretations of law and 
political economy in this period.  The oldest, most powerful, and most 
tenacious interpretation goes by the name laissez-faire constitutionalism.  So 
pervasive is this understanding of the relationship of law and economy that I 
need merely name it for most to conjure up a favorite example of a 
conservative, pro-business, Lochner-era jurisprudence frustrating progressive 
economic and social-welfare regulation.  The thesis of laissez-faire 
constitutionalism is as old as the Progressive Era itself—invented by a host of 
early twentieth-century activist scholars, among them Charles Beard,7 J. Allen 
Smith,8 Frank Goodnow,9 and Louis Boudin.10  These scholars were anxious to 
 
 7 CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HISTORY, 1877–1913, at 54 (1914) (describing 
the process of “Writing Laissez Faire into the Constitution”). 
 8 J. ALLEN SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, at vii, xi (1907) (aggressively attacking the 
immanent “reactionary” spirit of U.S. constitutional law and “its inherent opposition to democracy, the 
obstacles which it has placed in the way of majority rule”). 
 9 FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION, at v (1911) (opening his investigation 
with the straightforward statement of progressive purpose that “to ascertain, from an examination of the 
decisions of our courts, . . . to what extent the Constitution of the United States in its present form is a bar to 
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impugn an American judiciary that they envisioned as an obstacle to the 
legislative and administrative experiments of reform.  The progressive critique 
of turn-of-the-century jurisprudence was as unsubtle as it was materialist.  As 
Max Lerner summed up the reigning dogma,  
[T]he real Constitution became under capitalism merely the modus 
operandi of business enterprise . . . .  Capitalist enterprise in America 
generated . . . forces in government and in the underlying classes 
hostile to capitalistic expansion and bent upon curbing it: it became 
the function of the Court to check those forces and to lay down the 
lines of economic orthodoxy.11 
What is surprising is that despite a rash of critical revisionism dating back to 
the late 1960s, including the work of Alan Jones,12 Charles McCurdy,13 
Michael Les Benedict,14 Mel Urofsky,15 Barry Cushman,16 and Ted White,17 
laissez-faire constitutionalism remains alive and kicking—the dominant 
discourse in Howard Gillman’s The Constitution Besieged,18 William Wiecek’s 
The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought,19 and Owen Fiss’s Troubled 
 
the adoption of the most important social reform measures which have been made parts of the reform program 
of the most progressive peoples of the present day”). 
 10 LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, at viii (1932) (beginning with a typical, acerbic 
conclusion that “we are ruled frequently by dead Men . . . generations of dead judges”). 
 11 Max Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE L.J. 668, 671–72 (1933); see also 
Max Lerner, The Triumph of Laissez-Faire, in PATHS OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 147 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 
& Morton White eds., 1963) [hereinafter Lerner, The Triumph of Laissez-Faire].  For one of the finest critical 
evaluations of progressive historiography, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS: 
TURNER, BEARD, PARRINGTON (1968). 
 12 Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. 
HIST. 751 (1967). 
 13 Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some 
Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970 (1975); Charles W. McCurdy, 
The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869–1903, 53 
BUS. HIST. REV. 304 (1979). 
 14 Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of 
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293 (1985). 
 15 Melvin I. Urofsky, State Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progressive Era: A 
Reevaluation, 72 J. AM. HIST. 63 (1985). 
 16 BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION (1998). 
 17 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000). 
 18 HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE 
POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993). 
 19 WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN 
AMERICA, 1886–1937 (1998). 
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Beginnings of the Modern State,20 as well as the general histories of Robert 
McCloskey21 and Kelly, Harbison, and Belz.22 
The second important interpretation of law and economic regulation in this 
period goes by the name of the capture thesis—a curious example of what can 
result when New Left historians and New Right economists agree.  The 
essence of the capture thesis holds that, when initial economic regulation did 
escape the close scrutiny of laissez-faire courts, as in the case of the ICC or the 
FCC, for example, the regulation served not the “public interest” professed by 
the reformers, but the narrower interests of the regulated businesses 
themselves.23  As Chicago School economist George Stigler summed up the 
thesis for some unlikely intellectual compatriots in history: “[A]s a rule, 
regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily 
for its benefit.”24  In the hands of “corporate liberal” historians, the capture 
theme acquired a somewhat more sinister, class-based edge than the special-
interest or rent-seeking theories of the economists.  As James Weinstein put it, 
“[B]usinessmen were able to harness to their own ends the desire[s] of 
intellectuals and middle class reformers. . . .  These ends were the stabilization, 
rationalization, and continued expansion of the existing political economy, 
and . . . the circumscription of the Socialist movement . . . .”25  Caught between 
such twin assaults by left and right, the “public interest” or “public service” 
theory of regulation and administration articulated by progressive reformers 
 
 20 8 OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910 (2006). 
 21 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (5th ed. 2010). 
 22 1 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (7th ed. 
1991). 
 23 For early statements, see MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION 266 (1955) (“For regulated groups the regulatory process may be one method of converting 
public power into private gain.”), and Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the 
Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 472 (1952) (describing the “increased dependence” of 
the ICC on the railroad industry for support). 
 24 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) 
(emphasis added).  For further discussion of the capture thesis, see Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General 
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976), and Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 
5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974). 
 25 JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900–1918, at ix–x (1968); see 
also GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900–
1916 (1963); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916 
(1988).  Gerald Berk summarized this school of thought in an excellent review essay: “[C]orporate liberal 
scholarship, especially in its left-wing variant reintroduced class analysis into the study of twentieth-century 
politics, concluding that a powerful cadre of class-conscious corporate elites successfully used the state to 
stabilize modern capitalism and co-opt radical policy demands from below.”  Gerald Berk, Corporate 
Liberalism Reconsidered: A Review Essay, 3 J. POL’Y HIST. 70, 70–71 (1991). 
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themselves is often treated as no more than a pipe dream by contemporary 
social scientists.26 
The third significant interpretation, following Wallace Farnham and Moisei 
Ostrogorski, might be termed “The Weakened Spring of [American] 
Government”—the idea that the dominant story in the political economy of this 
period was a certain structural weakness, or a comparative deficiency, or an 
exceptionally limited trajectory in the nature of the American state and its 
response to the socioeconomic challenges of modern industrialism.27  
Originating in Farnham’s investigation of the role of government in the growth 
of the Union Pacific Railroad (which he characterized as a government “hardly 
govern[ing] at all”28), the weakened spring thesis has been only reinforced 
more recently by American Political Development literature fixated on 
demarcating the limited capacity of modern American statecraft in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from Stephen Skowronek’s 
characterization of state policy in this period as “patchwork”29 to Theda 
Skocpol’s voluminous chartings of the comparative laggardness of the 
American social welfare state.30  The list of odd and strained adjectives used to 
describe the modern American state is illuminating.  The American state is 
“uneasy” for Barry Karl,31 “reluctant” for Bruce Jansson,32 “divided” for Jacob 
 
 26 Two classic statements of the public interest theory are FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC & ITS 
GOVERNMENT (1930), and JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).  For some signs of a 
renewal of interest in public interest, see MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE 
PUBLIC GOOD (2002); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1285 (2003); David A. Moss & Michael R. Fein, Radio Regulation Revisited: Coase, the FCC, and the Public 
Interest, 15 J. POL’Y HIST. 389 (2003). 
 27 2 M. OSTROGORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES 550 (Frederick 
Clarke trans., 1902); Wallace D. Farnham, “The Weakened Spring of Government”: A Study in Nineteenth-
Century American History, 68 AM. HIST. REV. 662, 678 (1963). 
 28 Farnham, supra note 27, at 663. 
 29 STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920, at 46 (1982) (explaining how a pattern of patchwork reforms 
resulted from “the appearance of a series of notable institutional adaptations, each of which was caught in the 
unresolved tension between the governing demands of a new age and the triumph of th[e] old governmental 
order”). 
 30 THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1992) (“[I]t seems highly unlikely that the United States will ever converge with the 
Western welfare states fashioned between the 1880s and 1960s.”).  For an excellent overview and bibliography 
of American Political Development, see KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2004). 
 31 BARRY D. KARL, THE UNEASY STATE: THE UNITED STATES FROM 1915 TO 1945 (1983). 
 32 BRUCE S. JANSSON, THE RELUCTANT WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE 
POLICIES (1988). 
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Hacker,33 “hidden” for Christopher Howard,34 “inept” for Farnham,35 and 
“warped” for Ostrogorski.36 
Now, one should immediately notice that there is a certain consonance in 
these first three interpretations of the formative era of modern American 
political economy.  Despite the disagreements of individual authors, it is not 
impossible to imagine a synthesis involving a weak and uncertain general 
polity, easily captured and dominated regulatory agencies, and market-
policing, laissez-faire courts.  The overarching thrust of such a synthesis is 
economy trumping polity, a state deferential to, and incapable of, 
autonomously restraining the overweening interests of industrial, corporate 
capital. 
In just such a synthesis—highlighting a weak and dependent public sphere 
and powerful and expansive private interests—does the theme of corruption 
become paramount.  Corruption was a leitmotif for the progressive reformers.  
Beyond the well-known exposés of the muckraking journalists Ida Tarbell, 
Lincoln Steffens, and Ray Stannard Baker who gathered around McClure’s 
Magazine,37 progressive intellectuals and social scientists mounted a sustained 
attack on the perceived corruptions of the Gilded Age.  Indeed, historian 
Richard L. McCormick has placed the “Discovery That Business Corrupts 
Politics”—the awakening of the people to illicit business influence in 
American public life—at the very origin of progressive reform.38  Progressives 
used corruption in its classic sense indicating the despoiling of a distinctly 
collective public sphere (a republic supposedly devoted to res publica—the 
public things) by private and individual economic interests.  Corruption here is 
easy to understand and of an age-old character, with resonances readily 
comprehensible in the early republic: fraud, theft, extortion, and bribery by 
unvirtuous robber barons and politicos (to use Matthew Josephson’s evocative 
terms).39  What was new at the turn of the century was an awareness of the 
 
 33 JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL 
BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002). 
 34 HOWARD, supra note 5. 
 35 Farnham, supra note 27, at 678. 
 36 OSTROGORSKI, supra note 27, at 550. 
 37 LOUIS FILLER, THE MUCKRAKERS (1993) (originally printed as LOUIS FILLER, CRUSADERS FOR 
AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1939)); HAROLD S. WILSON, MCCLURE’S MAGAZINE AND THE MUCKRAKERS (1970). 
 38 Richard L. McCormick, The Discovery That Business Corrupts Politics: A Reappraisal of the Origins 
of Progressivism, 86 AM. HIST. REV. 247 (1981). 
 39 MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934); MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE POLITICOS 1865–
1896 (Commons new ed. 2008) (1938). 
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unprecedented threat to the polity posed by the arrival of large-scale business 
interests in rail, oil, meatpacking, and insurance, whose corruptions were 
cataloged in a seemingly endless series of reports and fictions from Charles 
and Henry Adams’s Chapters of Erie40 to Frank Norris’s McTeague, The 
Octopus, and The Pit.41  Laissez-faire constitutionalism was understood as a 
corruption of the American rule of law in precisely this sense—as a usurpation 
of the public law by private economic interests and philosophies.42  As 
Thorstein Veblen concluded in The Theory of Business Enterprise, 
“[C]onstitutional government has, in the main, become a department of the 
business organization and is guided by the advice of the business men.”43 
Fortunately, however, the laissez-faire, regulatory capture, and weak state 
and corruption themes are not the end of commentaries on turn-of-the-century 
political economy.  There is a fourth coherent “school” of thought on the state 
and economic regulation that introduces an interesting note of dissonance.  
This school consists primarily of business historians.  Alfred Chandler, the 
undisputed leading historian of American business, did not write often on 
public policy, but when he did, his conclusions were as crystal clear as the title 
of his leading article Government Versus Business: An American 
Phenomenon.44  Here Chandler emphasized not laissez-faire, not capture, not a 
crabbed and laggard state, but rather a distinct adversarial relationship between 
an anything but insignificant state and capital, and an anything but deferential 
law and business.45  To illustrate the business perspective, Chandler quoted the 
 
 40 CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR. & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE, AND OTHER ESSAYS (Cornell Univ. 
Press 1956) (1871). 
 41 FRANK NORRIS, MCTEAGUE: A STORY OF SAN FRANCISCO (Donald Pizer ed., 2d ed. 1997); FRANK 
NORRIS, THE OCTOPUS: A STORY OF CALIFORNIA (Penguin Books 1986) (1901); FRANK NORRIS, THE PIT: A 
STORY OF CHICAGO (Penguin Books 1994) (1903). 
 42 Thus the popular power of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissenting indictment in Lochner v. New York: 
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not 
entertain. . . .  The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social 
Statics. . . .  [A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of 
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.  
198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 43 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 287 (Cosimo Classics 2005) (1904). 
 44 ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., Government Versus Business: An American Phenomenon, in THE 
ESSENTIAL ALFRED CHANDLER: ESSAYS TOWARD A HISTORICAL THEORY OF BIG BUSINESS 425 (Thomas K. 
McCraw ed., 1988); see also Thomas K. McCraw, Business and Government: The Origins of the Adversary 
Relationship, 26 CAL. MGMT. REV. 33 (1984); David Vogel, Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The 
Political Consciousness of American Corporate Executives, 8 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 45 (1978). 
 45 CHANDLER, supra note 44. 
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often-echoed opinion of a former chairman at DuPont: “Why is it that I and my 
American colleagues are being constantly taken to court—made to stand 
trial—for activities that our counterparts in Britain and other parts of Europe 
are knighted, given peerages or comparable honors?”46  In explaining the 
rationale for such a common business opinion, Chandler accurately observed 
that the “regulation of business became the paramount domestic issue in 
American politics in the early twentieth century.”47  Citing the Interstate 
Commerce Act, the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the Clayton and Federal Trade 
Commission Acts that established a legislative framework for regulation, 
antitrust, and administrative commissions, Chandler revealingly concluded, “In 
neither Europe nor Japan did any such comparable response [against business] 
occur.”48  The exceptional nature of the American response to industrialism, in 
other words, lay not in a weak state or special-interest politics but in distinctly 
aggressive, “adversarial” economic regulations.  As Morton Keller wisely 
noted, “The land of the trust was also the land of antitrust.”49 
II. LAW AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM 
The dissonance between, and the irreconcilability of, business history and 
the other three interpretations of the origins of modern American political 
economy open up an intriguing question with which to begin a more positive 
reconstruction of the relationship between law and economic regulation.  What 
could the business historians and the laissez-faire constitutionalists be looking 
at to give them such diametrically opposed interpretations of the relationship of 
law, regulation, and economy in this formative era? 
In A History of American Law, Lawrence Friedman summarized the 
position of the laissez-faire constitutionalists by quoting from Edward 
Corwin’s classic progressive text The Twilight of the Supreme Court, and 
noting the five key cases that “annex[ed] the principles of laissez faire 
capitalism to the Constitution and put them beyond reach of state legislative 
power.”50  The five cases are wholly familiar to students of constitutional 
 
 46 Id. at 425 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 47 Id. at 428. 
 48 Id. at 425, 427. 
 49 Morton Keller, The Pluralist State: American Economic Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 
1900–1930, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 56, 65 (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1981). 
 50 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 269–71 (2d ed. 1985) (quoting EDWARD S. 
CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 78 (1934)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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history: Wynehamer v. People;51 In re Jacobs;52 Godcharles v. Wigeman;53 
Ritchie v. People;54 and Lochner v. New York.55 
Now, in addition to questioning the number of cases on which to base such 
a sweeping generalization about law and political economy in this volatile 
period, it is also fair to ask whether these cases reflect the most important 
fields of economic development and activity: liquor prohibition in Wynehamer, 
cigar rolling in tenements in Jacobs, a nail mill in Godcharles, hours of women 
in clothing manufactories in Ritchie, and the hours of bakers, again in 
tenements, in Lochner.  What is not represented by such cases?  Nothing less 
than some of the dominant sectors of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century American economy: (1) transportation and shipping (railroads, 
highways, grain elevators, ports, and streetcars); (2) communications 
(telegraph and telephone); (3) energy (electricity, water, coal, and petroleum); 
(4) agriculture and horticulture; and (5) money and banking. 
What do we know about these areas of economic activity?  They were the 
preeminent areas of industrial and corporate consolidation and expansion in 
this period.  And they were the areas that attracted the most intense 
governmental interest and intervention—the unprecedented regulations that 
Alfred Chandler argues generated an antagonistic relationship between 
government and business.  Indeed, to get ahead of the story just a bit, these 
were precisely some of the major sectors of the economy that lawyers, 
economists, reformers, and legislators were busily redefining as increasingly 
public in nature—public utilities and public services—subject to interventions 
ranging from increased police powers to direct rate regulation to outright 
public ownership. 
In The Economic Basis of Public Interest, Rexford Tugwell provided a 
short list of the economic activities that he could envision as essentially public 
services by 1922.56  (Bruce Wyman generated a far more extensive 
categorization in his earlier two-volume, fifteen hundred page, five thousand 
 
 51 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). 
 52 98 N.Y. 98 (1885). 
 53 6 A. 354 (Pa. 1886). 
 54 40 N.E. 454 (Ill. 1895). 
 55 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 56 REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF PUBLIC INTEREST 95 (Augustus M. Kelley 
Publishers 1968) (1922). 
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case treatise on public service corporations.)57  Tugwell listed fourteen public 
classifications that covered a vast portion of American economic life: 
1. Railways and other common carriers including express 
services, oil and gas pipe lines and cab and jitney lines. 
2. Municipal Utilities, so called, such as water, gas, electric light 
and power companies and street railways. 
3. Turnpikes, irrigation ditches, canals, waterways and booms. 
4. Hotels. 
5. Telephone, telegraph and wireless lines. 
6. Bridges, wharves, docks and ferries. 
7. Stockyards, abattoirs and grain elevators. 
8. Market places and stock exchanges. 
9. Creameries. 
10. Services for the distribution of news. 
11. Fire insurance businesses. 
12. The business of renting houses. 
13. Banking. 
14. Businesses of preparing for market and dealing in food, 
clothing and fuel.58 
Tugwell’s list illuminates a fundamental reality about this period obscured 
by some common interpretations of law and economic regulation.  The 
historical period between the end of the Civil War and the start of the New 
Deal, far from being marked by a laggard, captured, or constitutionally 
frustrated state, was in fact a period of formative governmental interventions 
into American economic life that transformed both economy and polity.  Well 
before the emergency legislative and regulatory experiments of the New Deal, 
the American state developed surprising new capacities and techniques to 
regulate and control business and commerce.  Chandler noted only the most 
well-known federal interventions: the Interstate Commerce Act (1887), the 
Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), and the Federal Trade Commission and Clayton 
Acts (1914).59  The actual regulatory output of both federal and state 
governments went substantially further, encompassing economic activities far 
beyond the expansive progressive idea of public utility. 
 
 57 1 BRUCE WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS AND ALL OTHERS 
ENGAGED IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT (1911). 
 58 TUGWELL, supra note 56. 
 59 CHANDLER, supra note 44, at 427. 
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In 1917 and 1918, John A. Lapp compiled an ambitious and comprehensive 
two-volume listing of federal laws, rules, and regulations (a primitive 
forerunner to the Federal Register).60  Lapp’s compendium serves as a useful 
index for the dramatic expansion of federal economic regulatory law at the turn 
of the century.  Contending that “scarcely any business can be done involving 
shipments across state lines without consulting . . . [the vast number of rules, 
regulations, and] restrictions in the interest of the common welfare which the 
federal government has thrown about business,” Lapp summarized and 
reproduced a range of pioneering federal initiatives, including: (1) federal 
banking legislation (including the establishment of the Federal Reserve 
System); (2) the Income Tax Act, the Corporation Tax Act, and other federal 
revenue regulations; (3) federal food, drug, meat, and narcotics acts; (4) federal 
labor regulations, including the Employers’ Liability Acts, child labor 
legislation, and assorted public works, safety, and inspection acts; (5) new 
trademark, copyright, and bankruptcy legislation; (6) the establishment of the 
Public Health Service; (7) an array of federal regulations of horticulture and 
agriculture, from farm loans to the quarantine of livestock to the interstate 
movement of potatoes; (8) certain federal regulations of immoral commerce, 
including the White Slave Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act; (9) the Shipping 
Board Act; and (10) the Federal Good Roads Act.61  This explosion of federal 
economic legislation was only supplemented by state regulations of commerce 
that frequently mirrored, but more often surpassed, federal interventionism.62 
While certain aspects of this active state involvement in the American 
economy had precedents dating to the early republic (e.g., Hamilton’s reports 
on manufactures and money and banking, the public promotion of internal 
improvements, state police power regulation of markets and goods, and Henry 
 
 60 JOHN A. LAPP, IMPORTANT FEDERAL LAWS (1917) [hereinafter LAPP, FEDERAL LAWS]; JOHN A. LAPP, 
FEDERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS (1918). 
 61 LAPP, FEDERAL LAWS, supra note 60, at iii. 
 62 Milton Handler provides a useful listing of state regulations of unfair competition (mostly established 
before 1932) that complements Lapp’s federal story: (a) antitrust laws; (b) trademark statutes; (c) food and 
drugs legislation; (d) labeling laws; (e) prohibitory legislation (e.g., cigarettes and oleomargarine); (f) chain 
store tax laws; (g) peddling and itinerant seller laws; (h) statutes prohibiting sales below cost or secret rebates; 
(i) legislation prohibiting the use of trading stamps and lotteries; (j) regulations of weights and measures; (k) 
fair trade acts; (l) acts prohibiting use of another’s list of customers; (m) restrictions on advertising, including 
billboard regulation; and (n) proration laws controlling production.  Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 
IOWA L. REV. 175, 232–35 (1936).  Unfair competition is but one area of state economic and commercial 
regulation.  A full listing would also have to include labor regulations, commercially significant health and 
safety rules, licensing, and professional regulations, among others. 
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Clay’s so-called American System),63 it would be a mistake to overemphasize 
the continuities.  The crises of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
industrial, corporate capitalism were far removed from the developmental 
issues involved in the emerging commercial, maritime, trade, and urban market 
economies of the antebellum years.  The regulatory controls were consequently 
of a different order.  Federal and centralized techniques augmented and often 
displaced state and local regulations in an effort to address the problems of a 
consolidated and cartelized national economy.64  Moreover, those techniques 
were increasingly administrative—the product of federal independent 
regulatory commissions newly invented to investigate, police, and direct the 
interstate market as never before.  Finally, and relatedly, the common law 
framework of early American economic regulation ultimately gave way to a 
federal constitutional jurisprudence focused on the proliferation of the new 
statutory and administrative rules and regulations progressively governing 
more and more areas of the nation’s economy. 
These regulations mark a new era in government-business relations in the 
United States and a reconfiguration of the relationship of law and American 
capitalism—a revolution in political economy missed by traditional 
interpretations highlighting anachronisms like a self-regulating market, a 
backward polity, and laissez-faire legalism.  This Essay proposes an alternative 
understanding of this revolution and the interactions among law, statecraft, and 
industrial commerce at its core.  Taking cues from the works of Morton 
Keller,65 Harry Scheiber,66 Louis Galambos,67 and Douglass North,68 it first 
emphasizes the overwhelming reality of what Claudia Goldin and Gary 
Libecap dubbed a “Regulated Economy” in this period—a perspective centered 
on the proliferation of new state actions and institutions controlling American 
 
 63 RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON (2004); JONATHAN R. T. HUGHES, THE GOVERNMENTAL 
HABIT: ECONOMIC CONTROLS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1977); JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, 
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE 
EARLY UNITED STATES (2001); GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION 1815–1860 
(1989); Robert A. Lively, The American System: A Review Article, 29 BUS. HIST. REV. 81 (1955). 
 64 LAPP, FEDERAL LAWS, supra note 60; WALTER THOMPSON, FEDERAL CENTRALIZATION: A STUDY AND 
CRITICISM OF THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION (1923); JAMES T. YOUNG, THE NEW 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND ITS WORK (1916). 
 65 MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN 
AMERICA, 1900–1933 (1990). 
 66 UNITED STATES ECONOMIC HISTORY (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1964). 
 67 Louis Galambos, The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History, 44 BUS. HIST. 
REV. 279 (1970). 
 68 DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., GROWTH AND WELFARE IN THE AMERICAN PAST (3d ed. 1983). 
NOVAK GALLEYSFINAL 2/24/2011  9:30 AM 
390 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60 
economic life.69  Also, drawing lightly on some of the theoretical work of 
postwar German critical theory as well as the more recent contributions of the 
French Regulationist School, I view this enormous rise in regulation not as a 
simple political adjustment or crisis intervention but as more generally 
reflective of the socially embedded and systematically regulated nature of 
modern capitalism.70  This regulation marks the emergence of a distinctive and 
new form of political-economic organization in the United States in which 
business and economic factors, far from determining legal and political 
arrangements (as in most of the interpretations explored in Part I), are 
themselves the subjects of a conscious and consistent legal and political 
manipulation as never before.  Friedrich Pollock called this realignment “State 
Capitalism,”71 though Andrew Shonfield’s moniker “Modern Capitalism,” 
highlighting a “Changing Balance of Public and Private Power” is perhaps 
more applicable to the American experience.72  Pollock captured the essence of 
the transformation when he argued, “The replacement of the economic means 
by political means as the last guarantee for the reproduction of economic life, 
changes the character of the whole historic period.  It signifies the transition 
from a predominantly economic to an essentially political era.”73 
Emphasizing the active political construction of modern American 
capitalism by definition requires a more thorough reckoning with the rule of 
 
 69 THE REGULATED ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY (Claudia Goldin & 
Gary D. Libecap eds., 1994). 
 70 See, e.g., MICHEL AGLIETTA, A THEORY OF CAPITALIST REGULATION: THE US EXPERIENCE (David 
Fernbach trans., 1979); THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF FRANZ L. NEUMANN AND 
OTTO KIRCHHEIMER (William E. Scheuerman ed., 1996). 
 71 Friedrich Pollock, State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations, in THE ESSENTIAL FRANKFURT 
SCHOOL READER 71 (Andrew Arato & Eike Gebhardt eds., 1982). 
 72 ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
POWER (1965).  Shonfield’s analysis is particularly right on the mark with regard to the early role of 
government in American capitalism: “Historically, American capitalism in its formative period was much 
readier to accept intervention by public authority than British capitalism.”  Id. at 301.  He makes a mistake in 
giving too much credence to the rise of laissez-faire in what he terms “The Reversal of the Late Nineteenth 
Century.”  Id. at 304. 
 73 Pollock, supra note 71, at 78.  Jürgen Habermas also offers a useful description of this transformation: 
The expression “organized or state-regulated capitalism” refers to two classes of phenomena, 
both of which can be attributed to the advanced stage of the accumulation process.  It refers, on 
the one hand, to the process of economic concentration—the rise of national and, subsequently, 
of multinational corporations—and to the organization of markets for goods, capital, and labor.  
On the other hand, it refers to the fact that the state intervenes in the market as functional gaps 
develop.   
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 33 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975) (footnote omitted). 
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law and a revision of some common assumptions about the relationship of law 
to state-building.  For, in contrast to the dominant techniques and strategies of 
continental European statecraft, the technologies of American state 
development and regulation in this period were overwhelmingly legal in nature 
and in practice.  And far from impeding new state economic controls, 
American public and private law were in fact sources of innovative tools and 
instrumental ideas through which a new relationship between the American 
state and modern capitalism was forged.  What were some of these positive 
legal technologies of state action?  The final Part of this Essay explores one 
such legal device in a bit of detail—the emerging concept of public utility.  But 
the period was replete with many other examples of law creatively supplying 
foundational ideas, frameworks, precedents, and tools for modern American 
state-building and economic regulation.  Two of the most important were an 
expanding conception of state police power (which moved increasingly in the 
direction of a de facto federal police power in this period) and the invention of 
modern administrative law (which produced the new independent 
administrative agencies expanding the jurisdiction and capacities of federal 
economic regulation).  But the roles of law and legal institutions also should 
not be overlooked in the development of such things as professional and 
occupational licensing, workers’ compensation, municipal justice reform, 
antitrust and a law of “unfair competition,” as well as potent new federal 
powers to tax and to spend. 
In the period from 1877 to 1932, a distinctive new state was created in the 
United States.  Reformers, jurists, and legislators consciously constructed 
through law a new sphere of sovereignty and creatively destroyed and 
expropriated the powers of competing political-economic jurisdictions.  This 
process included the forging of new national loyalties via the establishment of 
new citizenship rights and liberties, the invention of new mechanisms of social 
and cultural policing, and the establishment of a nationally regulated market 
for production, labor, and consumption.  This state-building project relied 
fundamentally on law, and it reflected anything but weakness, backwardness, 
or a governmental willingness to “leave alone.”  Legal and constitutional 
history’s obsession with classical and orthodox legal doctrines like laissez-faire 
constitutionalism, legal formalism, class legislation, and the public-private 
distinction, as well as economic formulas of regulatory capture, business self-
interest, and corporate liberalism has to some extent occluded an appreciation 
of this more fundamental shift from economic to legal-political priorities. 
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III.  THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 
But the legal-political construction of the modern American regulatory 
state was not solely a product of the imaginations of social theorists or the 
reinterpretations of revisionist historians.  To the contrary, it was explicitly 
advanced by a historical community of thinkers and reformers that consciously 
crafted an ambitious agenda of legal and political intervention—in effect, a 
legal-intellectual framework for economic regulation.  The language and 
proposals of this group of economists and law writers played a key role in the 
development of new legal and political controls over the burgeoning national 
economy.  The central tenet of this activist and professional discourse was 
something these thinkers dubbed “the social control of business.”74 
Key figures and formative texts in this political-economic discourse 
included Henry Carter Adams’s Relation of the State to Industrial Action and 
Economics and Jurisprudence;75 Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory of Business 
Enterprise;76 Richard T. Ely’s Property and Contract in Their Relations to the 
Distribution of Wealth;77 John R. Commons’s Legal Foundations of 
Capitalism;78 John Maurice Clark’s Social Control of Business;79 Bruce 
Wyman’s Control of the Market;80 Samuel P. Orth’s compilation Readings on 
the Relation of Government to Property and Industry;81 Robert Lee Hale’s 
Freedom Through Law;82 Walton Hamilton’s The Politics of Industry;83 and 
Rexford G. Tugwell’s The Economic Basis of Public Interest.84  Many in this 
group of political economists are wholly familiar figures in economic and legal 
 
 74 JOHN MAURICE CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS (1926); JOHN DEWEY & JAMES H. TUFTS, 
ETHICS 459–71 (rev. ed. 1932); BRUCE WYMAN, CONTROL OF THE MARKET: A LEGAL SOLUTION OF THE 
TRUST PROBLEM (1911). 
 75 HENRY CARTER ADAMS, Economics and Jurisprudence, in TWO ESSAYS BY HENRY CARTER ADAMS 
135 (Joseph Dorfman ed., reprt. ed. 1969); HENRY CARTER ADAMS, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 
in TWO ESSAYS BY HENRY CARTER ADAMS, supra, at 57 [hereinafter ADAMS, Relation of the State to 
Industrial Action]. 
 76 VEBLEN, supra note 43. 
 77 RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 
(1914). 
 78 JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924). 
 79 CLARK, supra note 74. 
 80 WYMAN, supra note 74. 
 81 READINGS ON THE RELATION OF GOVERNMENT TO PROPERTY AND INDUSTRY (Samuel P. Orth ed., 
1915). 
 82 ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 
(1952). 
 83 WALTON HAMILTON, THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRY (1957). 
 84 TUGWELL, supra note 57. 
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historiography.  Barbara Fried dubbed some of them “the First Law and 
Economics Movement.”85  But the positive role of these active thinkers in 
constructing the legal-institutional apparatus of the American regulatory state 
still remains undervalued by history.  Moreover, the extensive work of some—
like Bruce Wyman on public service corporations or Walton Hamilton on 
almost every aspect of price controls—has been almost completely neglected.  
Like Ernst Freund and Frank Goodnow—arguably the foremost legal architects 
of the modern American administrative and regulatory state86—their technical 
achievements have been obscured by a focus on the more visible and easily 
digestible achievements of muckraking and trustbusting progressives like 
Theodore Roosevelt. 
In the earliest texts in this tradition, the discovery that business corrupts 
politics remained a central theme.  In 1887, for example, Henry Carter Adams 
drew “a close connection between the rise of the menacing power of 
corporations and the rise of municipal corruption” and called for greater 
industrial responsibility to “conserve true democracy” and overcome the 
corrupt tyrannies of corporations and “commercial democracy.”87  But in the 
extended progressive struggle with the problem of monopoly through the late 
nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, business was increasingly viewed 
as a threat not simply because of its political influence or its potential 
corruption of local, state, or national governance (much less because of ancient 
economic evils like fraud, extortion, or bribery).  Rather, progressives 
increasingly considered monopoly and the concentration of economic interests 
as a problem in and of themselves with grave implications for what legal 
historian Willard Hurst called the “balance of power.”88  Hurst understood the 
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balance of power as a first-order principle of American constitutionalism.89  He 
defined it as the idea that  
any kind of organized power ought to be measured against criteria 
of ends and means which are not defined or enforced by the 
immediate power holders themselves.  It is as simple as that: We 
don’t want to trust any group of power holders to be their own 
judges upon the ends for which they use the power or the ways in 
which they use it.90 
In the early twentieth century, an increasing number of legal and economic 
commentators came to see the growing economic force of big business as a 
constitutional problem in this sense: as an imbalance of power in the United 
States.  Robert Lee Hale was but the most persuasive progressive writer on this 
theme.  In a series of essays later collected in Freedom Through Law: Public 
Control of Private Governing Power, Hale argued that the new concentrations 
of private economic power were slowly taking on many of the attributes 
formerly thought of as the exclusive prerogative of public sovereignty.91  Hale 
held that these new forms of “private government” were just as capable of 
exercising social force and coercion and destroying liberty as “public 
government itself.”92  But whereas public sovereignty had been the subject of 
developing constitutional protections since the seventeenth century at least, 
these new forms of private sovereignty were as yet unrestrained and 
uncontrolled by law.  The problem of private governmental power in trusts, 
unions, corporations, and other large associations became the focus of legal-
economic inquiry and reform in the first decades of the twentieth century 
precisely because they appeared to exist beyond the traditional jurisdictions of 
state sovereignty and common law.  An adequate legal-governmental remedy 
to this problem was not to be found in a series of laws insulating the political 
process from economic influence (yet alone a traditional reliance on common 
law litigation and ex post criminal prosecution).  Rather, the problem of 
monopoly and private-governing power, in the eyes of many of progressive 
authorities, required new legal and legislative restraints—an expansion of the 
economic police power of the state setting up government as a countervailing 
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regulatory force to the power of business and organization in American 
socioeconomic life.  Though antimonopoly had deep roots in the Anglo-
American legal tradition, this legal-economic analysis broke with earlier 
republican and Jacksonian and post-Civil War understandings of corruption by 
viewing private economic organizations as having a threatening center of 
power and sovereignty irrespective of any direct illegality or undue influence 
on the polity. 
By the early twentieth century, this more structural critique of private 
economic power, together with reform proposals for new public economic 
regulations, were synthesized and extended in the progressive call for the 
social control of industry, business, and the market.93  By the time one gets to 
the analyses of John Maurice Clark or Walton Hale Hamilton94 “corruption” or 
“illegality” were no longer central problematics.  Unscrupulous businessmen 
or politicians were not even on the radar screen, and the concentration of 
economic power was even seen as a potentially beneficent inevitability.  From 
corruption and monopoly, these theorists moved to a more systemic 
investigation of some of the structural weaknesses of business, markets, and 
capitalism itself.  Looking beyond litigation and even police power regulation, 
these lawyers and economists proposed much more involved and complicated 
remedies for economic problems seen as systemic rather than aberrational, 
remedies including public ownership, overt price controls, and the founding of 
new permanent institutions for investigating and controlling American 
economic life.95  Well before the economic catastrophe known as the Great 
Depression, these legal and economic thinkers had formulated an ambitious 
plan for the public social control of the American economy through ongoing 
administrative governance and economic planning.  They envisioned the state 
not as an economic policeman or even as a countervailing force to private 
economic power, but as a full, interactive partner in a legal-economic vision of 
modern state capitalism.96 
 
 93 One can get some sense of the evolution of this perspective in the early twentieth century by 
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The progressive movement for the social control of business built directly 
on the influential sociological work on general social control of Charles Horton 
Cooley and E.A. Ross.97  The language of socialization that permeated so 
much progressive reform owed more to these theories of modern social change 
than to the political agenda of socialism.98  The essence of these theories held 
that the fin-de-siècle United States was undergoing an epochal transformation 
from traditional to modern forms of social and economic organization.  In this 
massively dislocating process, older mechanisms of control and order were 
rapidly being rendered obsolete with potentially dire consequences.  Ross, like 
so many other social scientists of the era, drew directly on Ferdinand Tönnies’s 
work Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft99:  
[P]owerful forces are more and more transforming community into 
society, that is, replacing living tissue with structures held together 
by rivets and screws. . . .  [N]atural bonds, that were many and firm 
when the rural neighborhood or the village community was the type 
of aggregation, no longer bind men as they must be bound in the 
huge and complex aggregates of to-day.100   
Economic and technological changes were crucial harbingers of this 
transformation.  As Clark noted, “We are living in the midst of a revolution—a 
revolution which is transforming the character of business, the economic life 
and economic relations of every citizen, and the powers and responsibilities of 
the community toward business. . . .”101  A particularly acute sense of crisis, 
uncertainty, and fear surrounded thinking about the economic consequences of 
this revolution.  Clark warned explicitly of the potential for “bloody social 
warfare” and “catastrophe”102 in concurrence with Ross’s ominous forecast: 
“The grand crash may yet come through the strife of classes. . . .  But if it 
comes, it will be due to the thrust of new, blind, economic forces we have not 
learned to regulate. . . .”103 
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From this perspective, corruption and the problem of monopoly were 
primarily indicators of a much larger socioeconomic crisis.  And the central 
question was what new forms of control would arise to contain and regulate the 
new concentrations and organizations of economic power.  The legal-economic 
movement for the social control of business had many particular solutions to 
particular problems, but what they all had in common was an increased 
willingness to use the state—to turn to law and government—as the most 
effective tool of economic control.  As Clark argued, “The most definite and 
powerful agent of society is government, and in this country the municipal, 
state, and federal governments between them exercise the formal, legal power 
of control in economic life.”104  Though space here does not allow a thorough 
exploration of the important programmatic details with which reformers 
successfully made the case for the state control of the market, Clark provided 
an excellent overview of the vision as well as the accomplishments of the 
movement circa 1922: 
This period of fifty years has seen the growth of effective control of 
railroads and of public utilities; while electricity and the telephone 
have developed, first, into recognized public utilities, and, second, 
into businesses which transcend state boundaries and thus become 
essentially national problems.  Irrigation, land reclamation and flood 
prevention also belong properly in the class of interstate public 
interests, while radio and aerial navigation have but recently been 
added to the list.  The trust movement and anti-trust laws, 
conservation, the Federal Reserve system, vast developments in labor 
legislation, social insurance, minimum-wage laws . . . and the 
growing control of public health, prohibition, control over markets 
and marketing, enlarged control over immigration and international 
trade, city-planning and zoning, and municipal control of municipal 
growth in general, all have come about within this period.  On the 
frontier are health insurance, the control of the business cycle and of 
unemployment, and the insertion of social control within the structure 
of industry itself, through the “democratization of business.”  Back of 
these stand the stabilization of the dollar, and all the questions raised 
by birth control and the movement toward eugenics, while the control 
of large fortunes and of the unequal distribution of wealth is an 
ancient and ever new question which is becoming more and more 
acute as the masses gain a growing sense of their political power. 
This many-sided movement toward control cannot be 
disregarded. . . .  It may be guided and directed, its movements made 
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more informed and enlightened, but it cannot be stopped, and no one 
group can dictate its course.105 
Lest one think that such views were marginal, outside the mainstream in the 
economic and business community of the 1920s, Clark’s text on social control 
was written as a set of “Materials for the Study of Business” in the School of 
Commerce and Administration at the University of Chicago.106 
As Clark’s list of legal and legislative accomplishments suggests, the 
movement for the social control of business and the market was not simply a 
discourse (let alone a doctrine).  Rather, it involved a broad legal and political 
strategy for expanding state and federal police power, the overruling power of 
the state to regulate persons, organizations, liberty, property, and contract in 
the general interest of the public health, safety, and welfare.  And despite a 
secondary literature that continues to emphasize the constitutional limitations 
of a handful of state supreme court and U.S. Supreme Court cases, the 
overwhelming story of the police power from 1877 to 1932 is one of insistent 
expansion.  Measuring the incidence of something as categorically amorphous 
as police power regulation is notoriously difficult.  Still, by the end of this 
period (but before the New Deal), Congress was passing roughly 1,700 new 
statutes per session, and states like New York and South Carolina over 
1,000.107  By even the most conservative estimates, one-third of these new 
statutes were regulatory in nature.108  And as Charles Warren concluded as 
early as 1913, the vast majority of this regulatory legislation was readily 
sustained.109  Something of the efficacy of such controls on economic activity 
(which does not include private litigation or administrative actions) was 
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suggested when AT&T vice president Charles DuBois urged AT&T president 
Theodore Vail to consider government control in 1913—“a telephone and 
telegraph service ‘under the direct and permanent control and administrative 
responsibility of the federal government’”—as one way to escape the onerous 
corporate burden of local and state regulations.110  The extent that states were 
willing to go to control economic activity when necessary was suggested by 
the extreme action of Governor Ross Sterling of Texas who, in 1931, declared 
martial law in the East Texas oil fields in an effort to enforce the Texas 
Railroad Commission’s petroleum production controls.111 
Now these are nothing more than illustrations, and a convincing 
counterargument to the four interpretations of law and political economy 
outlined at the start of this Essay requires a much more sustained and 
systematic presentation of ideas, statutes, and cases than is possible here.  But 
perhaps one final concrete example of legal-economic policy making can 
suggest some of the interpretive possibilities in reexamining economic 
regulation in the Progressive Era with an eye toward the active state-building 
project outlined here. 
IV.  PUBLIC UTILITY 
One of the most important developments in the regulation of economic 
activity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and a perfect 
example of the creative force of law in the construction of the American 
regulatory state, was the legal invention of the idea of the public utility.  
Though the problem of antimonopoly and the development of state and federal 
antitrust law typically receive more historical attention, progressive lawyers 
and economists understood the law of public utilities (what Bruce Wyman 
termed the law of “public service corporations”112) to be a crucial battleground 
in the development of American regulation.  Today the concept of public 
utility has lost quite a bit of luster and most of its political aspirations—a 
product of contemporary privatization as well as a tendency to take utilities for 
granted.  But as Rexford Tugwell’s list of public interest services suggests,113 
progressives viewed the law of public utilities as a vibrant and expansive arena 
for experimenting with unprecedented governmental control over business, 
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industry, and the market.  While today most would restrict the idea of public 
utility to a couple of closely circumscribed industries (water, electricity, gas), 
in the early twentieth century, the utility idea encompassed urban 
transportation, railroads, motor bus and truck, telecommunications, radio, 
pipelines, warehouses, stockyards, ice plants, banking, insurance, milk, fuel, 
and packing.114  For progressive legal and economic reformers, the legal 
concept of public utility was capable of justifying state economic controls 
ranging from statutory police regulation to administrative rate setting to 
outright public ownership of the means of production.  Indeed, the public 
utility idea was so capable of further growth as to ultimately produce one of 
the most ambitious administrative and regional planning initiatives of the New 
Deal—the Tennessee Valley Authority.115 
The roots of a law of public utilities, of course, extended well back into the 
early republic.  Early American common law recognized a clear category of 
economic activities including innkeepers and ferry, cart, and coach companies 
as distinctly public in nature—common callings or common carriers subject to 
special restrictions and regulations in the public interest.116  The idea received 
additional support from the wide variety of mixed public-private enterprises—
turnpikes, canals, railroads—that fueled the antebellum transportation 
revolution.117  But the legal history of public utilities only really exploded after 
the influential United States Supreme Court decision in Munn v. Illinois in 
1877.118  In that well-known case dealing with the constitutional legitimacy of 
so-called Granger laws, the Court upheld an Illinois statute regulating the rates 
for the storage of grain in the warehouses and elevators operating around the 
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mouth of the Chicago River.119  Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite sustained the 
rate regulation as a legitimate exercise of the state police power—the power of 
Illinois to legislate in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and 
welfare.120  He did so by arguing that grain elevators (like ferries, railroads, 
bridges, and navigable waterways historically) were businesses “affected with 
a public interest” and consequently subject to extraordinary regulatory controls 
(including the legislative setting of rates and prices) for the common good.121  
Business “affected with a public interest” thus entered the legal-economic 
lexicon as a constitutional test for determining what economic activities could 
be considered public utilities subject to special state regulatory controls.122 
The Munn decision has been the subject of extensive historical 
commentary, which need not be rehearsed here.123  What is significant for the 
argument of this Essay, however, is the degree to which most historians agree 
that Chief Justice Waite’s opinion and particularly the line drawn around 
businesses affected with a public interest marked a typical constitutional 
limitation on the power of the American state and regulation that would last 
until the New Deal,124 or at least until the equally important Depression Era 
milk-regulation case Nebbia v. New York.125  Chief Justice Waite’s public 
interest doctrine, the argument goes, only succeeded in further insulating from 
police power regulation business not deemed affected with a public interest, 
especially as laissez-faire constitutionalism gained a firmer hold over late 
nineteenth-century jurisprudence.  In depicting the triumph of laissez-faire in 
law, Max Lerner held that Munn, along with the Slaughter-House Cases,126 
stood out “in melancholy solitude as part of the ‘road not taken’ when two 
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paths diverged for the Supreme Court in the constitutional wood.”127  Even 
Harry Scheiber, who along with his students has done more than anyone to 
illuminate the public regulatory power of the legal doctrines underlying Chief 
Justice Waite’s opinion in Munn, in the end concluded that the public interest 
doctrine proved to be as much a restraint on the power of the state as an 
enabling doctrine: “The Munn doctrine was fated to become, in the hands of an 
increasingly conservative Supreme Court, an equally effective shield against 
public regulation for business the court deemed strictly private.”128 
This narrow reading of Munn together with a relative neglect of the role of 
public utility law in progressive reform very much conforms to a 
historiography that privileges laissez-faire, capture, and an uneasy state.  But 
far from a “road not taken,” Munn was the very superhighway down which 
reformers drove a truckload of far-reaching experiments in the state regulation 
of new economic activity.  And the ramifications went beyond economic 
matters alone.  The very next time the phrase “affected with a public interest” 
was used in the Supreme Court was by Justice John Marshall Harlan in an 
attempt (for the time being unsuccessful) to widen the constitutional arena for 
civil rights regulation in the Civil Rights Cases: 
The doctrines of Munn v. Illinois have never been modified by 
this court, and I am justified, upon the authority of that case, in 
saying that places of public amusement, conducted under the 
authority of the law, are clothed with a public interest, because used 
in a manner to make them of public consequence and to affect the 
community at large.  The law may therefore regulate, to some extent, 
the mode in which they shall be conducted, and, consequently, the 
public have rights in respect of such places, which may be vindicated 
by the law.  It is consequently not a matter purely of private 
concern.129 
Over the next fifty years, the Supreme Court with few exceptions used the 
phrase “affected with a public interest” to uphold a wide variety of extensive 
economic regulations.  In Western Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, the Court used the 
language to sustain a California statute regulating admission policies at “any 
opera house, theatre, melodeon, museum, circus, caravan, race-course, fair, or 
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other place of public amusement or entertainment.”130  State appellate courts 
used Munn to even greater regulatory effect.131  Moreover, the Court made 
perfectly clear that the fact that a business or industry was not deemed to be 
legally affected with a public interest did not insulate that activity from 
ordinary police power regulations.  In Schmidinger v. City of Chicago and 
Holden v. Hardy the Court upheld a detailed regulation of the sale of bread in 
Chicago and an eight-hour day for Utah workers in mines and smelters without 
ever even acknowledging counsel’s contention that those police power 
regulations required a special finding of business affected with a public 
interest.132 
Contrary to some well-established interpretations regarding the relationship 
of law and economic regulation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, Munn v. Illinois did not mark the beginnings of an era of 
constitutional limitations or classical legal thought or a state capitulating to 
business.  On the contrary, Munn inaugurated an extraordinary era of 
innovation in the social control of business, industry, and the market.  It set in 
motion a panoply of new ideas like public utilities, rate regulation, price 
discrimination, fair rate of return, valuation, just price, and economic planning 
that dominated the legal and economic treatises of the era.  It propelled an 
agenda of economic regulation and controls that culminated in some of the 
more far-reaching experiments in public and government ownership of 
economic enterprises in United States history.133  Felix Frankfurter, from his 
perspective as one of the central legal advocates for the increased social 
control of business in the early twentieth century, understood exactly the 
implications of Munn and early public utilities law for the economic state-
building project of progressivism.  In an extraordinary essay on rate regulation 
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that he wrote with Henry Hart for the original Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, Frankfurter summed up the accomplishment: 
The resultant contemporary separation of industry into businesses 
that are “public,” and hence susceptible to manifold forms of control, 
of which price supervision is one aspect, and all other businesses, 
which are private, is thus a break with history.  But it has built itself 
into the structure of American thought and law; and while the line of 
division is a shifting one and incapable of withstanding the stress of 
economic dislocation, its existence in the last half century made 
possible, within a selected field, a degree of experimentation in 
governmental direction of economic activity of vast import and 
beyond any historical parallel.134 
The public interest doctrine of Munn did not insulate private business from 
regulation.  Rather, it created a new legal field of important economic activity 
that could be subjected to unprecedented state control from direct price 
regulation to outright public ownership. 
CONCLUSION 
Felix Frankfurter’s perspective on the historic nature of the level of state 
direction of the economy pioneered in the Progressive Era has to some extent 
been obscured by a powerful strain of exceptionalism in United States 
historiography.  The main feature of that exceptionalism is a continued reliance 
on some relatively anachronistic ideas through which to tell the story of the 
emergence of modern America—ideas like individualism, self-interest, 
localism, classical liberalism, laissez-faire, the free market, the common law, 
statelessness, and voluntarism.  This interpretive tendency has kept scholars 
from fully reckoning with the power of the American state and the role of 
government in all aspects of modern social and economic life.  This tendency 
is certainly present in economic thought and some economic history.  But the 
problem is particularly acute in history and legal history.  The continued 
emphasis in legal history on judges, the common law, and the main categories 
of nineteenth-century private law, and the relative neglect of statutes, 
legislation, administrative law, executive rule making, and public regulation 
has left a substantial and important portion of modern American governmental 
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history in the dark.135  Not a single aspect of American economic or social life 
has remained untouched by the legal output of the modern administrative and 
regulatory state, yet the historical emergence of that state remains relatively 
unaccounted for.  The origins of the modern American regulatory and 
administrative state were firmly planted in legal and constitutional 
developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  With 
respect to economic policy, those developments had little to do with ideas like 
laissez-faire constitutionalism.  They owed far more to broad-based movement 
in law and political economy for the state control of American capitalism. 
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